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Abstract
Relational goods provide a theoretical explanation for the puzzling fact that rational indi-
viduals engage in collective action, including political participation. Relational goods facilitate 
provision of public goods, although they are not public goods themselves. A relational good 
only exists when non-anonymous others share the good, the «identity» characteristic, but 
these might not be specific individuals in direct contact. «Indirect» relational goods, shared 
with persons of a certain type, such as a certain social identity, can also increase participation. 
It remains theoretically problematic how well-defined the «other» must be for a relational 
good to exist. The indirect relational goods provide key opportunities for elites to mobilize 
participation. Support for the role of relational goods in collective action comes from substan-
tial empirical work (using survey data and field experiments) examining the roles of publicity, 
group identification, and mobilization in increasing political participation. 
Keywords: Relational goods, social identity, mobilization, political participation, collective 
action.
Resumen
Los bienes relacionales ofrecen un marco teórico capaz de explicar el desconcertante 
hecho de por qué los individuos racionales participan en la acción colectiva, en la que se 
incluye la participación política. Los bienes relacionales facilitan la provisión de bienes pú-
blicos, aunque estos no sean en sí mismos bienes públicos. Un bien relacional sólo existe 
cuando se comparte un bien con otros sujetos no-anónimos –la característica de «identidad»– 
pero estos podrían no ser individuos específicos en contacto directo. Bienes relacionales 
«indirectos», compartidos por personas de un determinado tipo, como puede ser una cierta 
identidad social, también pueden aumentar la participación. Sigue siendo una problemática 
teórica el saber cómo definir bien la figura del «otro» para que pueda existir un bien relacio-
nal. Los bienes relacionales indirectos proporcionan oportunidades básicas para que las elites 
puedan lograr movilizar la participación. El apoyo del papel que desempeñan los bienes re-
lacionales en la acción colectiva viene ratificado por un sustancial trabajo empírico (basado 
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en encuestas y en trabajos de campo) que examina los papeles de la publicidad, de la identi-
dad de grupo y de la movilización de una creciente participación política.
Palabras clave: bienes relacionales, identidad social, movilización, participación política, 
acción colectiva
The fact that people engage in collective action is one of the more puz-
zling aspects of political behavior. If one assumes that people rationally weigh 
benefits and costs, then analysis concludes that most people will choose 
inaction. Since we observe many more members of the public participate 
than predicted, there is a contradiction, often thought of as a paradox. We 
can, at least partially, solve the puzzle by acknowledging that people value 
relational goods. These are goods which cannot be acquired by a person in 
isolation, but which only exist by mutual agreement as part of a relationship 
with specific others; moreover, sharing the good provides part of the value. 
Friendship is a prime example of a relational good. Various pieces of empiri-
cal evidence support the view that relational goods account for much politi-
cal participation. Moreover, understanding relational goods helps to clarify 
how and why group identity plays its substantial role in political behavior. 
Political participation is a form of collective action. The typical outcome is 
a public good (such as a government policy or an election outcome). At the 
same time, each individual’s actions (voting, demonstrating, giving money 
to a campaign, contacting an official) has a small to negligible probability of 
changing that outcome, even if collectively the actions are powerful. Why, 
then, would people take these actions? Many of the answers to this quandary, 
both those within a rational actor paradigm and those proceeding from soci-
ology or psychology, end up assuming that people do so for reasons beyond 
making an actual difference in achieving the collective outcome (see Bards-
ley 2005; Blais 2000; Aldrich 1993). They may act from a sense of duty, or from 
the sheer enjoyment of the action, or out of habit. Empirical research has 
established some factors associated with higher participation. Notably, elites 
increase participation via a process labeled recruitment or mobilization, but 
exactly what this means for the individual citizen is under-specified. It is very 
difficult to argue plausibly that the public good of the outcome provides the 
reason for action. And the various private goods proposed as reasons end up 
generating ad hoc explanations.
 Once we acknowledge that people value relational goods, however, the 
explanations become coherent. The increased participation associated with 
recruitment, with feelings of obligation, and with identification with some 
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group all indicate an important role for relational goods. As discussed below, 
in the contemporary United States, ethnicity and race serve as especially 
politically salient group identities1. Relational goods provide a theoretical 
grounding for the way these factors operate to increase participation.
Note that relational goods will not always increase the probability of po-
litical participation or, more generally, collective action. If the people with 
whom one relates instead consider action to have negative value or affirma-
tively value inaction, then the effect will be the opposite; relational goods 
will reduce political participation. Thus, (some) people must evaluate action 
nonnegatively for relational goods to increase participation. Second, for par-
ticipation to increase, a relational good must be tied to the participatory 
action, either inherently (received in the course of taking the action) or con-
sequently (increased as a result of taking the action). 
Many relational goods of course have no direct connection with politi-
cal participation or collective action; two people can share friendship with-
out any reference to politics. Someone can value being included as having 
a certain national homeland without political implications. But if one of the 
friends becomes an enthusiastic campaigner for an election candidate, or if 
others from that homeland equate support for language policies with the 
right to consider oneself a «real» member, then action maintains or strength-
ens the relational good. Relational goods are not themselves a public good, as 
Bruni (2008; also Bruni and Zamagni, 2007) points out. But the utility derived 
from them helps to account for why people are willing to contribute to ob-
taining a public good. 
A number of authors simultaneously developed the idea of relational 
goods,2 each with somewhat different definitions and emphases, and later 
accounts offer sometimes variant interpretations of the ideas. Bruni and Za-
magni synthesize these approaches to offer a list of «basic characteristics of 
a relational good» (Bruni and Zamagni, 2007, pp. 242-244; also Bruni, 2008, 
132-133).3 In what follows, I use that list to review and elaborate upon my 
conception of relational goods, with particular attention to the aspects of 
the theory that are important for understanding political participation. These 
include «identity» and the distinction between «direct» and «indirect» rela-
1 Relevant identities will vary in other places and at other times depending upon the political cleavages 
and political culture.
2 Bruni and Zamagni (2007 p. 239) credit the concept to myself (Uhlaner 1989a), Nussbaum (1986), 
Gui (1987), and Donati (1986). See also Gui (2000, 2005) and Donati (2011) for English language 
presentations.
3 These are «identity», «reciprocity», «simultaneity», «motivations», «emerging fact», and «goods» (versus 
«merchandise»). In my view, and when thinking of collective action, some of these characteristics are 
more central than others for characterizing relational goods.
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tional goods. I then present some of the accumulating empirical evidence for 
the importance of relational goods in understanding political participation, 
drawing in particular upon work on ethnic and racial politics. I also discuss 
how to improve research by more explicitly incorporating relational goods 
into theory. 
UHLANER’S CONCEPTION OF RELATIONAL GOODS
Consistent with other scholars, I conceive of relational goods as some-
thing apart from either private or public goods. «Relational goods can only be 
enjoyed if shared with some others» and where «a person’s utility increases 
both as his or her own consumption increases and as the consumption of 
some specific other person or member of a defined set of people increases» 
(Uhlaner, 1989a: 254). This concept corresponds to Bruni and Zamagni’s «rec-
iprocity» characteristic (2007: 243). With a public good, in contrast, a person 
would be just as happy to consume it all on her own; I enjoy clean air wheth-
er or not you are breathing it, too. I can even enjoy the public good of seeing 
a beautiful sunset without you; the additional enjoyment I get from sharing 
the view with someone else is a relational good. Second, relational goods 
can only be ‘possessed’ by mutual agreement; they exist only after a person 
and non-arbitrary others take appropriate joint actions (Uhlaner, 1989a: 254). 
This corresponds to Bruni and Zamagni’s «simultaneity» term (2007: 243). 
Not only does a relational good appear simultaneously in the utility func-
tions of two or more people, but its presence in both is what increases the 
enjoyment (utility) of each person. For my theoretical purposes, the «moti-
vations,» «emerging fact,» and «goods» characteristics (Bruni and Zamagni 
2007: 243-244) blend together. A relational good requires the relationship 
(as the reciprocity and simultaneity terms also suggest) but moreover has 
meaning and utility in itself, not solely as a means towards another end. In 
that regard, and somewhat contradictory to Bruni and Zamagni’s character-
ization of my view, I do see «friendship» as a relational good: people may re-
peatedly interact in various ways without being friends, but the relationship 
of «friendship» is a relational good, requiring mutual recognition. Moreover, 
somewhat counter to Bruni and Zamagni’s «motivation» term, but consistent 
with Gui (2005), I agree that while a relational good must be valued for itself 
and must be pursued for its own sake, nonetheless it can additionally be use-
ful for obtaining something else without forfeiting definition as a relational 
good. A friend may in future find that her relationship eases obtaining a job 
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interview; as long as the friendship was not pursued for that end, it remains 
a relational good. 
The remaining characteristic on the Bruni and Zamagni list, «identity,» 
(2007: 242-243) is both fundamental and problematic. As noted just above, 
for me a relational good must involve a relationship between someone and 
some specific other or others, not just an anonymous relationship. For many 
relational goods, such as friendship or love, as ordinarily understood, the in-
teraction must be with a specific person. For others, such as Nussbaum’s 
(1986) «civic commitment» or Sugden’s (2002, 2005) «fellow-feeling,» the re-
lationship may be with any or many other individuals including ones known 
only as a «type» of person rather than as a specific named person. In the sun-
set example from above, or while sitting in a theater, I may even derive a rela-
tional good, a pleasure, from sharing the experience with strangers. I do not 
know their names nor expect to see them again, but I do recognize them as 
somehow like me (very much in the sense of Sugden’s fellow-feeling). While 
complete anonymity disqualifies a good from being relational (for example, 
the value of «money» depends upon mutual agreement, but the value is inde-
pendent of whoever provides it), a very short step away from anonymity may 
be sufficient to create the conditions for a relational good. Moreover, an ex-
ternal objective observer cannot ascertain how much non-anonymity is suf-
ficient to create a relational good; it inheres in the subjective experience of 
each actor. These more impersonal relational goods, which are important for 
understanding political participation, raise interesting questions about sub-
jectivity and objectivity and about how much «identity» is needed to make a 
«good» relational. «Identity» thus is a slippery yet crucial component of the 
characterization of relational goods.
Admittedly, some contrarian persons put high value on being unlike oth-
ers, and hermits value solitude; the effects of relational goods on actions 
would be different for them than for most people. Therefore, for simplicity, 
but also realistically, the following discussion assumes most people wish to 
be like others and to be connected to others. Note that even for someone 
who prefers to be «unlike,» the relational goods still differ from ordinary 
private and public goods. However, much of this literature, including what 
follows, focuses upon those who are sociable rather than the hermetic ex-
ceptions.
My earlier work (Uhlaner 1989a, prefigured in Uhlaner 1986) developed 
the idea of two types of relational goods labeled «direct» and «indirect,» ac-
cording to whether the contact among those interacting is in person (direct) 
or at a distance (indirect). Donati’s primary and secondary relational goods 
(2011: 158) capture a similar distinction. These types roughly correspond 
52 RECERCA, REVISTA DE PENSAMENT I ANÀLISI, NÚM. 14. 2014. ISSN: 1130-6149 - pp. 47-72
to interaction with a primary group versus with a secondary group, but my 
concept is a continuum rather than a dichotomy, as there are degrees of in-
directness.
 In the direct case, individuals interact face-to-face (these days, possibly 
virtually instead of literally), but in any event they know each other person-
ally. The relational good arises from interaction with a specific known other 
individual, and thus mutual knowledge and mutual observation are both 
likely. Here there is clearly no anonymity. Moreover subjectivity and objectiv-
ity will coincide; both or all parties will agree that they are in a relationship 
with each other.4 Direct relational goods can increase political participation, 
as when one life-partner expects the other to vote. In my formal develop-
ment (Uhlaner 1989a) I modeled the relational good as each party valuing 
being the same as the other, as valuing the other taking the same action, or 
inaction, as oneself. Whether increased participation follows depends upon 
the relative values of the non-relational benefits (the other instrumental and 
consumption benefits from participation, minus the costs) as compared with 
the relational good benefit (Uhlaner, 1989a: 263). There is some role for elite 
mobilization, by enhancing coordination and side payments or by manipulat-
ing perceptions of the other participants’ values. However, since direct rela-
tional goods by definition involve individuals who are in direct contact, the 
room for manipulation is constrained. 
Valuing acting the «same» is a relational good because it requires simul-
taneous, reciprocal action with a specifically identified other person. One 
cannot act the same as someone else in isolation, or absent shared action. 
Admittedly, in this conception valuing being the same might be interpreted 
as instrumental to the goal of maintaining the relationship, such as friend-
ship, and thus the relational good seen as instrumental and not inherent in 
the relationship. Choosing to act the same thus maintains the relationship 
and the relational good which arises from it. 
I now think that my earlier discussion (1989a) neglected another aspect 
of relational goods. People who are in a relationship find value in being to-
gether and, in the case of participation, taking similar actions. My prior de-
velopment omitted the relational good that arises from the action itself, the 
utility derived from doing something with a valued other person. Consider 
a person who is helping a political candidate’s campaign by making phone 
calls to potential supporters and who asks her friend to do the same. If they 
each get a list of numbers to contact and make the calls in isolation in their 
separate homes, they derive some relational good benefit from sharing their 
4 This assertion may not hold for persons detached from reality; we assume basic sanity.
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work in support of the candidate. But if they sit together in the same room 
making the calls, they have the added relational good arising from the com-
panionable time spent together. 
More generally, my previous development focused too much upon people 
participating in part to maintain a friendship or other relationships, thereby 
making the action instrumental towards maintaining a connection that pro-
vides relational goods. What I failed to include, and now see as very impor-
tant, is that the act of participation itself provides relational goods, or can do 
so. My spouse may want me to vote and by doing so I enhance our domestic 
tranquility, but I also derive some real pleasures from visiting with my neigh-
bors while waiting in line at the polling place. Similarly, relational goods may 
be obtained by people making phone calls in the campaign headquarters 
where they have camaraderie with fellow campaigners, or by people attend-
ing a community meeting and socializing. 
These examples move us farther towards the «indirect» good end of the 
spectrum. The indirect goods are both more useful for understanding politi-
cal participation and more problematic to define. «A person can derive rela-
tional benefits from a group even in the absence of face-to-face contact. For 
such benefits to be available, a person must think of him or herself as part 
of a group. . . . Although in the case of indirect contact, the outcome to an 
individual, and hence the value of these relational goods, depends upon the 
actions of both self and others, those others need not be explicitly aware of 
one’s decision-making [or, I would now say, actions]» (Uhlaner, 1989a: 256). 
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of such goods is social identity, the feeling 
of belonging to a particular group in society and being accepted by the other 
members of that group. 
The conceptual problem arises from the notion of «group.» Groups vary 
along a continuum in terms of how identifiable members are to each other 
and the nature of their interactions and thus whether the relational goods 
are direct or indirect. At one end, specific individuals know each other and in-
teract directly. In groups farther along the spectrum, members interact with 
some other members whose actions they can observe, but they know many 
other members only by type and have only indirect contact. At the far end 
of the continuum membership depends only upon a subjective sense self-
enforced by adherence to perceived norms. Anonymity lies just a short step 
away, yet pure anonymity would take us outside the realm of relational goods. 
Even if at the far end of the indirect goods the specific others are not exactly 
identifiable, neither are they entirely anonymous. I may not know the other 
people by name, but I do know them as being supporters of candidate X, or 
residents of neighborhood Y, or people who share my ancestral homeland, 
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and feel a connection to them on that basis that I value maintaining. Solidary 
goods, or sociability, fall into this middle ground, where a person feels con-
nected to some specified subset of people even without really knowing who 
they are. 
The direct relational goods are in many ways easier to understand. It seems 
that (almost) everyone values friendship, and there are probably sound evo-
lutionary reasons for this preference. The indirect relational goods are likely 
less universal and in any case more variable. While there is a general propen-
sity towards «groupness,» as shown by the work of Tajfel (1982; Tajfel et al., 
1971) and Turner (1975; 1982) and others working on social identity, indi-
viduals differ. Individuals also differ in how broad a definition they accept for 
their group, with «all of humanity» or «all creation» an extreme claimed by 
some, but credibly only by very few. Relational goods closer to the anonymity 
pole depend more upon the person’s subjective sense of self-identification; 
the farther from anonymity, the more it depends upon objective inclusion by 
others. 
A further conceptual distinction – between consumption and instrumen-
tal indirect relational goods5 – clarifies the role of relational goods in politi-
cal participation. The distinction arises especially in understanding elite mo-
bilization and the role of group identity. The consumption indirect relational 
goods are those whose receipt depends only upon performing some action. 
For instance, participants in a protest demonstration against the killing of 
whales derive a consumption relational good from an enhanced sense of 
self as an environmentalist (or perhaps more specifically as a supporter of 
Greenpeace), along with whatever direct relational goods, including enjoy-
ment of the event, they receive from interacting with other people at the 
protest. These direct and consumption indirect relational goods depend only 
upon having been a participant, independent of the effect. But additionally 
the protest may have some policy consequence, such as stimulating tighter 
regulation of whaling or increasing the salience of the issue. That part is avail-
able to all members, whether or not they participated, and thus faces the 
usual problems of public goods. The additional investment relational good 
arises «if action by one’s group bolsters the group’s political identity» (Uhlan-
er 1989a: 257) thereby increasing its power and influence and, crucially, the 
person only gets his or her share of that enhanced identity by having taken 
5 Benedetto Gui distinguishes between consumption relational goods and relational goods that take 
the form of capital where the latter «is first accumulated and then put to use in further interactions» 
to produce further relational goods (Gui 2005:. 42; also Gui 2000). This distinction is related to mine 
between consumption and investment relational goods, but not identical, given his broader and my 
narrower focus. 
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part in the action, thereby strengthening the claim to membership in the 
group. These relational goods, like the others, depend upon the actions both 
of the self and of other people. Slogans used by the Obama campaign in 2008 
played on feelings like these, asking prospective voters (or abstainers) to «be 
part of the change.» In sum, in these cases, the consumption indirect relation-
al goods involve enhancing one’s own sense of identity, while the investment 
indirect relational goods also enhance the value of that identity.
The above examples presume that the value of relational goods will in-
crease the benefit of collective activity, but this presumption rests upon po-
litical action being valued. For some groups, identity includes the avoidance 
of politics, and in those cases the relational goods will weigh against political 
action and decrease activity. Various religious groups have at different times 
and places made a virtue of avoiding the secular and especially of avoiding 
secular authority. In those cases, consideration of relational goods may ac-
count for lack of political action in circumstances where otherwise it might 
be expected. However, we have seen groups shift attitudes from avoidance 
of politics to embracing it; the Christian New Right in the United States pro-
vides one example.
Indirect relational goods provide multiple opportunities for elite actions 
to increase participation.6 A person deciding whether or not to act weighs 
both individual benefits and costs and relational goods in his or her utility 
function, weighting according to personal preference. For clarity of exposi-
tion, assume the person prefers to be accepted by others and that acting 
similarly increases acceptance. The relational goods received after acting – 
or not – will depend upon what the relevant others do. Thus the person’s 
decision requires predicting the actions of others. That prediction rests upon 
assessing the individual benefits and costs of action for others and also the 
value the others place on similarity, the relational good. In the indirect case, 
third parties – such as elites with an interest in mobilization – can easily 
affect these estimates, as people will have little first-hand information about 
each other. Elite mobilization, then, may happen by persuading people that 
others whose relationship they value are likely to act (so similarity requires 
one’s own action). Elites may also mobilize by persuading someone that oth-
ers are unlikely to be dissuaded by one’s own reluctance to act (that they 
value similarity less). Instrumental indirect relational goods provide benefits 
beyond similarity and acceptance. The benefits of action increase if the po-
tential participant believes enough members will participate to enhance the 
6 The summaries below are formally developed in Uhlaner 1989a using game theory and decision 
theory analyses.
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group’s political presence, and the benefits increase further the greater the 
value of that political presence. Thus, an elite-conveyed message that «every-
one» is acting would increase activity, counter to what one would expect 
of free riders. The key point is that leaders can manipulate and enhance the 
value of relational goods.
When political action is connected to receiving relational goods, the fol-
lowing additional conditions are likely to lead to political participation by 
members of the relevant group. Where members of the group interact more 
with each other there will be more activity, as there is more opportunity for 
direct relational goods to exist and to reinforce indirect relational goods. The 
value of the relational good will rise, thereby increasing activity, if members 
strongly identify with the group, and rise more for those who care most 
about the identity. Finally, the connection of the relational good to political 
activity will be more effective and thus lead to more action if the members 
of the group are more homogeneous in their political preferences, such as 
for a particular political policy or leader.7 The available empirical evidence 
provides suggestive, albeit not definitive, support for these propositions.
Of course not all political participation produces social good, despite the 
implicit positive evaluation in much of the contemporary political science 
literature. Collective action of all types can be harmful. History presents many 
cases of people working together to produce social ills (gangs, Blackshirts, 
ethnic «cleansers»). Elite mobilization often plays an important role in those 
cases, and all the considerations above apply. Whether the behavior is for 
good or ill, the same paradox of collective action applies and relational goods 
provide an answer in either case. 
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT: MOBILIZATION, FIELD EXPERIMENTS, 
SOCIAL MEDIA
Over the last decades, accumulating empirical work supports the role of 
relational goods in producing political participation. This work rarely explic-
itly references relational goods, but the interpretation is often straightfor-
ward. One important strand of this work uses sample surveys and shows the 
importance of recruitment. Another strand using field experiments shows 
the effectiveness of recruitment and of scrutinizing activity. Other support 
comes from work on the political behavior of ethnic and racial minorities. 
7 When preferences are heterogeneous, group members are less likely to feel that group identity de-
pends upon acting in a particular way.
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Two studies explicitly test relational goods. One (Leighley 2001) uses indica-
tors rather distant from the concept and finds mixed results, while another 
(Le 2013) which uses better indicators of relational goods finds a substantial 
effect on political activity.
Arguably the most fully realized account of political participation comes 
from the work of Sidney Verba, Henry Brady and Kay Schlozman (1995). They 
define political participation quite broadly, including both electoral and non-
electoral activities and protest. Their Civic Voluntarism Model holds that po-
litical participation results from an individual’s resources, engagement, and 
recruitment. Each of these factors increases participation, even controlling 
for each of the others. The resources include education, income, and adult 
civic skills (many of which are acquired within a group). Engagement in-
cludes psychological factors associated with concern about politics, such as 
general political interest, specific interest in an issue, party affiliation, feeling 
efficacious, and believing the norm that political activity is important. Note 
that in their work the norm is quite general, and there is no development as 
to its source or specificity. Recruitment refers to being asked to participate 
and is the component most germane to relational goods. They find that at any 
level of resources and engagement, participation increases when someone is 
asked to participate. The increase is especially high when the request comes 
from someone known to the target (p.157), but the increase is also observed 
when the request comes from a religious figure, the workplace, or a leader 
of an organization to which the person belongs (pp. 389-390). Their work 
does not go further to explore the content of the request or why requests 
increase activity.
Relational goods suggest an explanation for why recruitment works to 
increase activity. The fact that recruitment is more effective when the rela-
tionship is closer suggests that the pursuit of relational goods factors into the 
acquiescence to act. If someone requests that I take an action, their prefer-
ence is clear, as is my expectation that they will be pleased if I agree. I thus 
expect agreement to yield direct relational goods. Requests in the context of 
a workplace, place of worship, or organization will increase the value of the 
relational good and hence activity to the extent that the person values being 
part of that group.
Recruitment is not perfect; many people say no. People weigh the rela-
tional good with their other, non-relational benefits and costs from action. 
Moreover, the measures of recruitment in most studies, including Verba et al. 
(1995), are not precise enough to distinguish between the person who val-
ues being part of a particular group and the one who is indifferent or alien-
ated. In a society where there is free association, it is reasonable to assume 
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that there are more of the former than the latter. Hence overall recruitment 
will add positive benefits from relational goods to the plus side of the deci-
sion, and we get the observed association between being asked and acting. 
Substantial support for the role of relational goods also comes from a 
growing body of field experiments studying voter mobilization, especially in 
the United States (see Green, McGrath, and Aronow 2013 for a review). While 
these authors do not explicitly discuss relational goods, the results strongly 
suggest their importance in producing activity. In these studies, researchers 
contact randomly selected potential voters with different messages and de-
livery mechanisms before an election. After the election, the researchers use 
official records to verify who voted. With that information they assess the 
effectiveness of the different contacts relative to the uncontacted control 
group.8 
The types of contact vary in the amount of personal interaction they in-
volve, and their effectiveness increases as there is more (Gerber and Green 
2000; Green and Gerber 2008; Green, McGrath, and Aronow, 2013). The most 
effective method to increase turnout is door-to-door canvassing, where a 
campaign worker shows up in person to talk to the potential voter. Next in 
effectiveness come phone calls from committed volunteers. Much less effec-
tive are materials sent in the mail with a general exhortation (but see below) 
or phone calls from paid workers. Anonymous email blasts do nothing at all. 
Even the most effective form, the canvassing, does not produce many votes 
per contact, but it does far better than the impersonal forms. When a real 
person makes a real request, a relational good is much more likely to be pro-
duced then when information is received from an anonymous source. The 
telephone contacting is more effective when done by someone from the 
same political party as the contacted person; not only does that make sense 
in simple strategic terms, but such a contact is also more likely to evoke indi-
rect relational goods, a sense of the group.
 Subsequent field experiments investigating «social pressure,» «shame,» 
and «pride» even more clearly suggest the role of relational goods. These ex-
periments manipulate the information people have about the past and future 
behavior of themselves and others and their beliefs about who will be told 
about their own future behavior. Overall, the results show higher turnout 
when a person thinks someone is watching whether or not they voted, and 
even more so when they think the information will be told to members of 
8 About half of eligible individuals vote in U.S. presidential elections, and fewer in congressional, state, 
and local elections, so there is substantial variation to explain, unlike many other polities. At the same 
time, there is widespread normative agreement in the U.S. that voting is a good thing and a citizen’s 
duty. 
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their household or to their neighbors. People are more likely to vote when 
they believe someone close to them will have information on their fulfill-
ment of the norm.
For example, Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) ran an experiment in a 
Michigan 2006 election in which one group of people were provided a gen-
eral normative exhortation to vote, a second group was just told that research-
ers were watching (but would not contact them again), a third group was 
provided their household voting history and told it would be updated after 
the election, and a fourth group was provided the same information and also 
for their neighbors’ households (ten households in the authors’ example). 
The four conditions increased turnout over the control group by, respec-
tively, 1.8, 2.5, 4.9, and 8.1 percentage points. The first two are basically con-
sistent with past results for the effect of mailed messages, just somewhat on 
the high side. The last two are a dramatic increase; when neighbors are told 
about neighbors, and informed that their own activity will be reported, the 
8 point increase is equivalent to the turnout increase achieved by campaign-
ers appearing in person on the doorstep. In the context of a widespread U.S. 
norm that voting is good, and on the assumption that most people wish to 
be accepted by their residential neighbors, these results strongly suggest the 
importance of a relational good in increasing activity. The third condition is 
ambiguous, since the researchers focus on the prospective voter receiving 
reports about his or own activity, but in fact the reports cover all members 
of the household. There is thus both a personal and a direct relational good 
component.
Sinclair, McConnell, and Green (2012) eliminate that ambiguity by limit-
ing the contact and report to one member of each treated household. They 
find effects for the contacted person comparable in size to those in the third 
condition above (about a 4.5 percentage point increase in turnout). The turn-
out of other household members went up but only by about 1.3 points; 
they were not threatened with the monitoring of their behavior. Neighbors 
were treated quite differently; unlike in the 2008 study, there were no lists 
of neighbor behavior. Instead the study examined whether there were spill-
over effects in the neighborhood and did not find them. This null result sup-
ports the relational good interpretation for the 8 point increase observed in 
the 2008 study; what mattered was the direct sharing of information about 
neighbors with each other, not simply separate treatment of individuals who 
happened to live nearby. 
With a somewhat different design, Panagopolous (2010) reported an-
other experiment where relational goods seem to have played a clear role 
in increasing turnout. Residents of two small towns in Iowa (populations 
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3600 and 1150) were respectively told that the names of voters would be 
published in the local paper (pride) or that the names of non-voters would 
be similarly publicized (shame). Turnout increased by about five percent for 
those promised pride and 7 percent for those threatened with shame, large 
increases compared with past work on mailed contacts. These increases in 
response to the promise of publicity in a small community suggest that rela-
tional goods are being weighed. The relational goods explanation gains more 
support from the fact that Panagopolous observed essentially no change in 
turnout in a third town where residents were promised «pride.» This third 
town was an order of magnitude larger than the first two9 and moreover 
likely to have weaker norms supporting voting.
Other studies found increases in turnout by telling people their own be-
havior is being monitored, though the effects are smaller than when neigh-
bors are involved. Gerber, Green and Larimer (2010) showed members of a 
household their past participation or abstention (with a promise to follow 
up) and found similar increases in turnout to those achieved in the house-
hold condition in the 2008 Gerber et al. study. Similarly, Panagopolous, Larim-
er, and Condon (2013) increased turnout when they reported past activity to 
individuals and promised future monitoring. «What seems to matter to voters 
is an indication that someone or some entity is monitoring their voter record, 
and the thought of such observation increases their chances of going to the 
polls,» (Panagopolous, Larimer, and Condon, 2013). In these cases with only 
a few points increase in turnout, the evocation of relational goods is possible 
but less clear than in the case with neighborhood publicity. 
A Facebook experiment provides additional evidence that people will 
claim to vote and actually vote so as to be similar to those they «like.» The re-
searchers provided three types of messages to all U.S. residents of voting age 
who accessed Facebook on Nov. 2, 2010 (the day of a national election for 
members of Congress). The «social» treatment group (with 61 million mem-
bers) was «shown a statement at the top of their ‘News Feed’. This message 
encouraged the user to vote, provided a link to find local polling places, 
showed a clickable button reading ‘I Voted’, showed a counter indicating 
how many other Facebook users had previously reported voting, and dis-
played up to six small randomly selected ‘profile pictures’ of the user’s Face-
book friends who had already clicked the I Voted button.» (Bond et al., 2012: 
295). A second treatment group (about 600,000) were shown all the above 
except NOT the pictures of friends. A third group of about 600,000 served 
9 Holland, Michigan, was the site, population 35,000. Not only is this substantially larger than the Iowa 
towns, lessening the chance of close personal ties among all residents, but also Iowans are noted for 
their political engagement, Michigan residents less so.
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as the control and received no message. After the election, the researchers 
validated turnout for a subset of their subjects.10 Persons who received the 
informational message were no more likely to vote than the controls, while 
those who were shown pictures of «friends» were significantly more likely 
to vote (and to claim to vote by clicking the «I Voted» button). The increase 
was only .39 of a percentage point, but with the huge sample size, this was 
still a highly significant increase. Friends, but only close ones,11 of those who 
received the social treatment also were more likely to vote and to claim to 
vote, again by a small but statistically significant amount.
The results reported above suggest the role of relational goods in over-
coming the collective action dilemma of political participation, but none 
are definitive. Paying explicit attention to relational goods suggests how to 
construct better tests and better models. In particular, these studies do not 
take account of variations across individuals in their desire to be like others, 
and in some cases they apply a broad definition of the «other.» Thus, the re-
lational component is at best inferred. For example, relational goods theory 
implies that recruitment measures in survey work should interact whether 
a person is asked with how much attachment the person feels towards the 
group doing the asking.
In some cases the test could be tightened even with existing data. For 
example, in the Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) study, no distinction was 
made among neighborhoods in terms of their voting rates. Some of the neigh-
borhood clusters reported to the subjects may have relatively more abstain-
ers than others, in which case the locally normative behavior might be to 
abstain. For those clusters, the relational good component would decrease 
turnout with publicity, muting or reversing the overall effect. Conversely, the 
increase in turnout would be stronger for subjects living in neighborhoods 
where the rate was higher. More obviously, the distinction between only one 
versus all members of a household receiving information is crucial from the 
perspective of relational goods, yet treated unclearly and inconsistently in 
the current studies (except in Sinclair et al. (2012).12 Data could be reana-
lyzed to take closer account of household effects.
10 They used records from 13 states accounting for 40% of U.S. registered voters. Using first name, last 
name, and birth date, they found about 6 million successful matches from which they derived their 
estimates of actual (as opposed to self-reported) voting and abstention rates.
11 Closeness was measured by frequency of Facebook interactions.
12 Gerber, Green and Larimer (2010) eliminated households with three or more persons registered to 
vote. They are unclear how they handled households where one person voted in a prior election and 
the other did not; it seems from their description they must have omitted those households from the 
experiment. The examples in Panagopolous, Larimer, and Condon (2013) suggest that individuals 
learned only about their own history, not that of other household members, in contrast to the other 
studies mentioned, but the article is not explicit on this point.
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Unfortunately, these data are not sufficient to address another key implica-
tion of relational goods, namely, that these effects should be far stronger in 
situations where people actually care about others. Some of the variations 
the researchers find across different sites may well result from differences in 
how much people care to be accepted by their neighbors. In that regard, the 
Facebook study does have the advantage of having a measure of voluntary 
interaction, which is a reasonable indicator of the desire to maintain a con-
nection.
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND GENDER IDENTITY
Other support for the role of relational goods comes from work on the 
connection between racial, ethnic, or gender identity and participation. In 
contemporary U.S. politics, these categories serve as some of the omnipres-
ent types of identity, both personal and political. Ethnicity, race, and gender 
provide a basis for instrumental relational goods for people who desire ac-
ceptance in these groups and who wish to maintain a self-image as a member. 
Moreover, these groups’ political role guarantees that there will be elites13 
who try to provide messages designed to increase political activity by mem-
bers. As noted much earlier in this essay, the relational goods operating in 
these instances are typically closer to the anonymity end of the spectrum, 
where people care about their relationship with others known simply for 
their shared characteristic.
The evidence in this literature for relational goods effects is widespread 
but mainly indirect. First, much research has examined the behavior of peo-
ple who identify with a group and believe that group has a claim to political 
redress for inequitable treatment. Most studies find increased political partic-
ipation by people who have «group consciousness» or who perceive «linked 
fate» (Verba and Nie, 1972; Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1981; Uhlaner, Cain, and 
Kiewiet, 1989; Tate 1991; Dawson 1994; Dawson 2003; Stokes 2003; Sanchez 
2006). McClain et al. (2009: 476) explain «group consciousness is in-group 
identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one’s group’s 
social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by 
which the group can improve its status and realize its interests.» Linked fate 
entails perceiving that one’s own life is affected by treatment of the group as 
a whole. Hence, the boost which group consciousness and linked fate give to 
participation partially reflects pursuit of an indirect instrumental relational 
13 These political entrepreneurs include unelected leaders. See Uhlaner 1989b.
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good. Some studies find little increase in activity with group consciousness, 
especially for non-African Americans (e.g. Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Mea-
surement discrepancies account for some of the differences across studies 
(McClain et al. 2009). More fundamentally, some types of groups may be 
better-suited than others to give rise to indirect relational goods.14 
A second stream of U.S. research found that members of historically un-
derrepresented groups (racial and ethnic minorities and women) participate 
more when they have representatives – or candidates running for office – 
from their group. A person who is descriptively represented in this way sees 
a representative who is «like me» and thus has that identity primed for poli-
tics and also gains efficacy. Moreover, the candidate who shares race, gender 
or ethnicity has an incentive to mobilize on these grounds. Latino turnout 
increases when there are Latino candidates or the likelihood of Latino candi-
dates, although the data are strongest for local elections (Barreto, Segura, and 
Woods, 2004; Barreto, Villareal, and Woods, 2005; Barreto, 2007; but Leighley 
2001 finds no increase). Other studies find African American participation 
increases with local representation but not necessarily with representation 
in Congress (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Leighley, 2001; Tate 2003; Gay 2001 has 
mixed results). Rocha, Tolbert, Bowen, and Clark (2010) find that the turnout 
of both Latinos and African Americans increases when they have more de-
scriptive representatives in the state legislature.
There is some evidence that women candidates and officials increase 
female turnout and interest in politics (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; 
Reingold and Harrell, 2010). Uhlaner, Scola, and Cooper (2013) found that 
descriptive representation in the state legislature increases turnout for white 
women and both African American men and African American women. Al-
though these results are suggestive, they lack any subjective component, so 
the assumption that relational goods are at play is somewhat tenuous.
A stronger link can be made. I have argued (Uhlaner 1989a, 1989b, 2002) 
that individuals often connect to the larger political world via leaders who 
enhance a sense of duty and who can effectively recruit if recognized con-
cerned for the citizen’s interests. If relational goods increase participation, 
then those individuals who feel connected to a political leader will be more 
active. Those elites have both the means and the incentive to provide ben-
efits for action or exact sanctions for inaction. A person who feels that there 
is a leader who will potentially defend his or her interests is more likely to 
respond to that leader’s request for action than in the absence of that linkage. 
Moreover persons who feel represented by someone are more likely to be in 
14 This point is pursued further in the conclusion.
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a relationship where that representative has a channel through which he or 
she can recruit them and whereby benefits and sanctions can be transmitted. 
The representation literature naturally focuses upon formal representation 
by persons elected to office, but the relevant elites also include representa-
tion by interest groups and other intermediate bodies. 
Some data support these claims. The 1990 Latino National Political Survey 
(LNPS)15 taps subjective representation by asking respondents, «Is there any 
group or organization that you think looks out for your concerns, even if 
you are not a member?» The majority of Latinos were served by non-Latino 
elected officials, but numerous intermediaries have attempted to organize 
Latinos along ethnic and national origin lines. About a quarter to a third of re-
spondents (depending upon national origin and citizenship status) say they 
thought someone looked out for them. For each Latino national origin group, 
for both citizens and noncitizens, persons who feel represented are more 
likely than those who do not feel represented to participate in both electoral 
and nonelectoral activities (Uhlaner 2002).16 One finding is especially sugges-
tive that the elite relationship is producing the increased activity via the en-
hancement of indirect relational goods. The most marginalized respondents, 
the noncitizen Mexican Americans, are the persons least likely to participate 
more when they perceive subjective representation. Thus, perhaps the pro-
cess requires a minimum threshold of incorporation with a corresponding 
minimum sense of duty to act and perception of sanctions and incentives 
attached to political activity.
EMPIRICAL WORK WHICH PAYS EXPLICIT ATTENTION  
TO RELATIONAL GOODS
Two empirical studies of ethnic politics explicitly assess the role of rela-
tional goods. Leighley (1991) incorporates the concept of relational goods 
into her examination of the effects of political context on political partici-
pation, especially for Latinos and African Americans. Leighley uses a variety 
of both national U.S. and Texas data from the mid-1990s to test her models. 
She finds solid support that mobilization (or, interchangeably, recruitment) 
15 The LNPS separately sampled Mexican American, Cuban American, Puerto Rican, and «other» adults 
across the U.S., including both citizens and noncitizens. 
16 Subjective representation increases voting and registration among Mexican American and Puerto 
Rican citizens. The one exception to its effects occurs for Cuban American citizens; those who report 
subjective representation are a little less likely to register and to vote. Subjective representation in-
creases participation in all five of the other measured activities for both citizens and noncitizens of 
all three national origin groups. 
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increases participation. Her findings on relational goods are mixed. In part 
she argues there is strong support due to the increase in participation when 
there is recruitment, and especially recruitment by a known individual. In 
other tests, she construes the relational good argument to predict that there 
will be an increase in mobilization or in participation when the minority 
population is larger, and finds instead no or negative associations between 
group size and mobilization and participation.17 However, I would expect 
no particular relationship between the number of minority individuals in an 
area and some of the factors important for producing relational goods, such 
as the density of interactions, and at best a very weak association with other 
factors, such as the desire to be part of the group. The null results on the ef-
fects of group size thus seem to me to be testing group size, not relational 
goods. She does, however, find that individuals of all races are more likely to 
vote when they perceive their neighborhoods as more racially or ethnically 
homogeneous.18 That result is consistent with the effect of relational goods, 
albeit not strong support. Nonetheless, on the whole, Leighley concludes 
that her study supports the argument that relational goods increase political 
participation.
More pointed evidence comes from a recent study by Le (2013) of Viet-
namese Americans in Orange County, California. She surveyed a more limited 
population, but the concepts are operationalized closer to the theory. She 
used relational goods to develop a measure of susceptibility to social pres-
sure which incorporates all of an individual’s 1) sense of belonging 2) desire 
to belong and 3) feeling of linked fate with others in the group. She then 
asked individuals whether they thought others in the group expected them 
to politically participate in specific ways. She found that people who thought 
they belonged, wanted to belong, thought their fate was linked with others, 
and thought political action was expected of members of the group were 
indeed more likely to participate than other people. The result holds even af-
ter taking account of other factors that increase participation. Le’s approach 
gets to the crux of a relational good – do you participate more when you 
care if you are accepted and think that acceptance calls for certain activities? 
She finds that the answer is yes for a number of types of participation, with 
the effect especially pronounced for activities which others can observe. She 
also finds that recruitment increases participation in highly visible activities. 
She could, but has not yet, directly assess whether the people who respond 
17 One example of Leighley’s intermittent (over) interpretation: «Uhlaner’s ‘relational goods’ argument… 
posits that minority group members will be more likely to participate (i.e. contribute) as their group 
increases in size» (Leighley, 1991: 128)
18 As she notes, this is contrary to her expectation for Anglos.
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most to recruitment are those who care the most about belonging to the 
community.
CONCLUSION
Human beings engage in collective endeavors with each other to produce 
public goods, even when this behavior puzzles social scientists who believe 
in human rationality. The puzzle has particularly vexed students of political 
participation. Many solutions to this paradox have relied on people valuing 
something in addition to the collective outcome of their actions. If what 
people additionally value takes the form of ordinary private or public goods, 
such as getting a souvenir tee-shirt if they turn up at a campaign rally, then 
traditional analyses suffice. The structure of analysis changes, however, when 
we recognize that people also value goods that exist only in the interaction 
between themselves and others, such as shared experiences with a friend 
at the rally. These relational goods demand a different approach to analysis. 
They also lead to conclusions which make collective behavior more likely 
and thus less puzzling. The person who goes to the rally for the tee-shirt 
would be just as happy if the tee-shirt were delivered to his door without the 
trouble of attending the event. The person who wants to savor memories of 
an experience with a friend needs both the experience and the friend.
 Research has shown that people are more likely to participate when 
asked and even more likely when the recruiter is someone they know, thus 
when direct relational goods may be at stake. Elite actions to mobilize partici-
pation also increase activity. Clearly one person can reduce the costs of activ-
ity for another, for example by providing information. But why would being 
the recipient of a request increase the propensity to act? Relational goods 
provide an answer. Moreover, development of the theoretical implications of 
relational goods leads to specific expectations about which elite messages 
could mobilize activity. Elite mobilization is particularly likely to rely on pro-
vision of relational goods when group membership is invoked.
The social science literature is filled with studies indicating the impor-
tance of group identification for political behavior, including political partici-
pation, especially for groups relatively excluded from power, such as women 
and members of minority racial and ethnic groups. Relational goods help 
clarify why politicized group identification, such as group consciousness and 
feelings of linked fate, generally increases participation. But they also suggest 
why sometimes these have little or no effect. The disparity may arise from 
where the indirect relational goods associated with the group sit on the con-
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tinuum from relatively anonymous to almost direct. The politicized group 
identifications may more effectively increase participation when they are 
undergirded by direct relational goods
We thus circle back to the problematic issue of «identity» as a character-
istic of relational goods. The empirical results suggest that indirect relational 
goods will be most effective in increasing activity when there is more inter-
action with specific others, that is when they lie closer to the direct end of 
the continuum or when direct relational goods are at stake. Thus, turnout 
increases more when Gerber Green Larimer (2008) tell their respondents 
the voting history of specific named neighbors than when Panagoloulos 
(2010) promises to publish the names of voters and abstainers. Panagoloulos 
(2010) finds a larger effect in tiny communities than in a larger town, where 
neighbors are less likely to face the people who read a list in the newspaper. 
Further support comes from Le’s (2013) finding that the effects of social 
pressure are stronger for activities more readily observed by other people. 
For an action to be visible, other people must be around, so a direct relational 
good is obtainable.
The indirect relational goods appear to operate most powerfully where 
joined with a direct element as well, that is when they are closer to the iden-
tity pole and farther from anonymity. One reason is that anonymity increases 
the reliance on self-enforcement. With more face-to-face contact, especially 
for more visible actions, surveillance is possible. People can less readily lie 
about their behavior; they can be seen to act, or not. Secondly, when people 
are only distantly and indirectly connected they may perceive group norms 
very differently; they may even hold contradictory beliefs as to what is re-
quired to maintain their «standing» and membership and never be aware 
of a discrepancy. In a direct relationship, people can correct each other in 
both regards. The more indirect the relational good the more subjectivity is 
involved. 
 These considerations suggest which kinds of groups may be better-suited 
than others to give rise to indirect relational goods. Groups differ as to how 
easily members can be identified by others who do not know them person-
ally. Sharing race or gender means that one can be identified by other group 
members –for compliance with norms, for learning normative behavior, for 
accepting others– even absent personal acquaintance. Members can also 
be more readily identified by the majority for out-group treatment. Other 
groups, such as ones defined by religion or ideology or many ethnicities, are 
not as identifiable. Perhaps members of such groups wear a visible symbol 
of their identity, such as distinctive dress (a turban), symbols (a necklace 
with a cross or a shamrock), buttons («Save the Whales»), to advertise their 
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membership. Then fellow members who spot them can believe they will act 
in accord with the group’s norms and extend acceptance. Groups differ also 
in the intensity with which their members identity, although the amount of 
that intensity is not exogenous. Nonetheless, given some level, it affects the 
value of relational goods. Lying to oneself will be costlier the more one is psy-
chologically invested in having a particular identity and accepts the norms 
which go along with it.19 The tough theoretical issue remains of delineating 
how well-defined or known the «other» needs to be for relational goods to 
exist. Where there is direct interaction with others the relational goods can 
be fairly straightforward. Where the interaction is not direct, but only occurs 
subjectively for the person, what defines the other? What balance of objec-
tive and subjective identification is needed for a group to be able to provide 
relational goods?
Wherever that boundary may lie, relational goods put the connections 
among human beings back into the study of human behavior. The paradox of 
political participation arises when we think of people acting only as isolated 
egoists. Collective action makes more sense for people who also value their 
connections with each other. Those connections can extend to relationships 
with people one has never met, but with whom one identifies (whether be-
cause of some shared demographic characteristic or for other reasons). Lead-
ers can use relational goods in such settings to mobilize collective action. 
Relational goods help explain why people join to act together.
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